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Inter ethnic and inter religious conflict all over the world is enmeshed in identity discourses
about ‘the self’ and ‘the other’. This study attempts to understand the role of public discourse
and its language of signs, symbols and narratives in shaping perceptions about ‘the other’ during
situations of inter ethnic violence. It focuses on the communication dynamics within the Hindu
community during a case of targeted anti Muslim violence in Gujarat, India 2002 to understand
the role of dehumanization and prejudice in causing and legitimising such violence. It argues that
identity discourses such as the Hindu Right discourse in India contributes to dehumanizing
religious minorities, especially Muslims. The process of dehumanization works at multiple levels
in society and contributes to human rights violations.
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1.1. Introduction to the case and the problem
On February 27, 2002, a train called the Sabarmati express travelling between Faizabad
and Ahmadabad in Gujarat, Western India, was stopped and torched at a place called
Godhra. An estimated 59 people died, most or all of whom were Hindus (Amnesty
International, 2005). More than six years later, the facts of the incident are yet to be
established clearly. However, the incident was widely projected as an attack by Muslims
on the Hindu community, and the ‘retaliation’ was fierce. According to a report released by
the Editors Guild of India:
“….the anticipated backlash took on the dimensions of a holocaust primarily aimed
at the Muslim community…” (Editors Guild, 2002:1)
This and several other reports1 establish that the violence in Gujarat 2002 was a case of
targeted anti Muslim violence, enacted with state complicity.
The Indian state is a signatory to several human rights conventions and treaties. For
instance, India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in
1979. The ICCPR guarantees that the right to life of all citizens shall be protected by law.
The case of Gujarat was a flagrant violation of these human rights principles. Though
1
See, for example, The International Initiative for Justice (2003) Threatened Existence: A Feminist Analysis
of the Genocide in Gujarat
Available online at www.onlinevolunteers.org
Also : Human Rights Watch (2002) “We Have No Orders to Save You” State Participation and Complicity in
Communal Violence in Gujarat
Stable URL at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/
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official estimates number the dead at around 800, unofficial estimates are way higher,
starting from a minimum of 2000 killed and at least 2,500 missing (Editors Guild, 2002:1).
Approximately a hundred thousand people were rendered homeless (Mathur, 2008: 11).
My interest in the issue was raised when I visited Gujarat in the summer of 2003 to work
as a volunteer to engage in building cultural understanding between the religious
communities post the violence. My position as a student activist and an outsider to both the
region and the issue (in that I am neither Gujarati, Hindu nor Muslim) gave me the
advantage of access to several people and opinions from both the Hindu and Muslim
communities. However, there was one exceptional instance in which I was perceived as a
member of the Muslim community, which I will bring up later in this study. During the
course of my stay in Gujarat, what struck me most was not the horror of the violence
(though that gave one plenty of food for thought), but its legitimisation. My interaction
with several middle class Hindu youth and with activists working in Gujarat left me with a
strong impression that the violence was deemed acceptable by sections of the Hindu
community. This raised my research question: how is violence between communities that
are culturally similar in many ways, enabled and legitimised?
During the course of my interaction with sections of the Hindu community in Gujarat, I
heard repeated references to ‘the other’ (.i.e. the Muslims) and their responsibility in
starting the violence by torching the train at Godhra. This argument struck me as strange.
Statistics showed that Muslims were clearly the victims of the violence, so how could one
blame the Muslim community for the violence? The argument was that the Muslims had
started it all by torching the train, and thus were to blame for the violence directed at them.
This points to the possible role of prejudice and stereotypes in the violence. Thus, one way
of trying to understand the social dynamics of the violence is to focus on the public
discourse afloat during the violence within the Hindu community, and try and answer the
question: how far does prejudice, arising out of public discourse, enable and legitimise
interethnic violence?
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Working with an idea that ‘dehumanization’ is a key ingredient in enabling human rights
violations, my analysis will focus on the domain of culture to see how this dehumanization
of the Muslims has come to be expressed. For that, I will look at both the historical
background and the contemporary expressions in public discourse. In doing this, I will use
an interpretative approach. That is to say, I will attempt to read the signs used in the
language of the conflict to understand what role they play in causing and legitimizing
extensive violence. The Hindu ‘retaliation’ in Gujarat to a perceived attack by the Muslims
will be used as a case study to illustrate the role of such symbols in violent conflicts. My
focus here will be on the cultural expressions, the metaphors, symbols etc. that gained
ascendancy in the Hindu Right discourse and how they express social boundaries.
I see two main dimensions to the communication dynamics during the violence: first, the
signs and symbols afloat amongst the Hindu community during the violence (what I call
the Hindu-Hindu communication dynamics), and the way these signals were perceived by
the Muslim community, in this case the victim (Hindu-Muslim communication dynamics).
The main focus of this study is the first dimension: that is, the communication dynamics
within the Hindu community. What messages did the leaders of the Hindu Right send to
their audience i.e. the Hindu community in Gujarat? What signals and narratives
constituted this discourse, and how were these signals perceived by the Hindu community?
These are the questions that I will try and address in the course of my analysis. The focus
on this Hindu-Hindu communication dynamic has been supplemented by occasionally
touching upon the Hindu-Muslim communication dynamics by referring to voices from the
Muslim community. The larger aim of the study is to understand the social dynamics of the
violence.
1.2. Objectives of the research
The following are the objectives of the research:
 To identify the range of cultural expressions associated with the violence afloat in
the Hindu Right public discourse.
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 To analyse the role of these cultural expressions of the Hindu Right discourse in the
enactment and legitimisation of the violence.
1.3. Importance of the study
Why explore the discourse and the cultural domain of the public sphere in order to
understand the dynamics of interethnic violence? How can an analysis of cultural
expressions contribute to understanding the intertwined and complex social, political and
other dynamics that constitute interethnic violence?
One argument which stresses the importance of the link between violence and the domain
of culture has been put forward by Shubh Mathur. Comparing cases of violence by
democratically elected governments (such as the violence sponsored by the Hindu Right in
India)2 with violence sponsored by military dictatorships in countries like Argentina and
Guatemala, she argues that an analysis of culture and its link with violence is especially
significant in cases where it is sponsored by democratically elected institutions. This is
because in a democratic setup, one needs to seek causal factors beyond the concentration
of power or armed might in dictatorial governments. Violence in democratic contexts, she
argues, is not executable without tacit public consent (Mathur, 2008: 13). Based on this, I
hope to show how an understanding of culture, as expressed through the public sphere, can
provide important clues to understand the tacit public consent to inter ethnic violence.
There are limitations to this kind of analysis in understanding mass violence and militancy,
since public discourse is not the only or ultimate reason why such killings take place.
Violence is inevitably complex and multi-faceted, and there can be no one causal
explanation for mass killings. The starting point of this study is thus the acknowledgment
of this complexity. The focus on social factors or phenomena such as the circulation of
2
In 2002, the BJP (the political party of the Hindu Right) was in power both in Gujarat as well as at the
centre (national level).
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cultural metaphors has been chosen keeping in mind that an understanding of the multiple
social dynamics involved in the violence is impossible to accomplish within the current
space and time constraint. Thus, the cultural domain is only one of, but nevertheless an
important, factor in understanding targeted mass violence.
This study is based on an idea that the dehumanization of a community plays an important
role in enabling large-scale human rights violations. The concept of dehumanization is
especially relevant for the field of human rights research, since the idea of human rights is
based on the idea of equality for all individuals3.That is, it approaches all human beings as
individuals in their own right, regardless of their national, religious or any other identity.
Following from that, I would argue that the struggle to ensure justice for victims of human
rights violations is a struggle to rehumanize them .i.e. enabling them to be viewed as
individuals equal to all others. I hope that this study will contribute to this endeavour: it is
by understanding the politics of dehumanization and mass violence that we can hope to
counter it and contribute to ending human rights violations.
1.4. Some Important Terms
Some terms used in this thesis are specific to the case study and should be explained:
 Communalism
The term ‘communalism’ in the Indian subcontinent is specifically used to denote hatred
between or towards another religious community (ies).
 Islamophobia
The term can be defined as “…an irrational fear or prejudice towards Islam and
Muslims…” (www.islamophobia.org)
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Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) states that: “All human beings are born




Hindutva or Hinduness is an ideology propagated by the Hindu Right forces in India today.
The notion of Hinduness is supposed to bridge the huge gaps of caste, class and other
differences that exist amongst Hindus in India, building an idea of a Hindu nation (rashtra)
in which all peoples defined as Hindu can participate (Mathur, 2008:43).
However, Hindutva is not an emancipatory ideology: on the contrary, it seeks to retain the
power imbalance in Hindu community. In order to ‘unify’ Hindus, it propounds a model of
social harmony that does not address, but retains the internal conflicts and hierarchies
amongst Hindus. The authoritarian model of Hindu society provides “a moral and ethical
basis for individual sacrifice and surrender to the leaders at the top” (Banerjee, 1991: 97).
Since this ideology is the defining feature of the propaganda of the Hindu Right forces in
India, the terms “Hindutva discourse” and “Hindu Right discourse” have been used
interchangeably throughout this dissertation.
1.5. Background
In order to understand the processes of boundary construction between communities, it is
necessary to understand the historical processes behind it. In this section, I will outline the
history of communalism and the historical context in which the Hindu-Muslim dichotomy
emerged in India.
Perspectives on history
History is a contested domain, and there are differing historical perspectives on Hindu-
Muslim relations in India. It is possible to identify two major historical perspectives. The
first of these argues that Hindu-Muslim antagonism in India dates back to pre-modern
times. It follows that Hindu Muslim riots in India today are part of an older problem that
has been endemic in Indian society for a long period of time (Bayly, 1995). Thus, violence
between religious communities is something that occurs spontaneously and naturally.
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I find this view rather rigid and essentialist, and see it as part of the problem of
communalism in India today since it explains away inter religious violence by using vague
terms such as tradition and spontaneity instead of trying to understand its contemporary
dynamics. Indeed, this is the view of history that Hindu fundamentalist organisations in
India today prescribe to, a point that I will return to later in this study.
A view that tries to understand the complex dynamics of inter ethnic violence will provide
a starting point for a solution to such violence. This is what the constructivist perspective
seeks to do. The constructivist perspective views communalism in India as a modern
construction, and sees communalism as a ‘mask’ used to promote political, economic and
power interests. This is the school of thought that scholars like Paul Brass belong to (Brass,
2003: 25). This study also takes a constructionist approach. Taking this approach as a point
of departure, I will now briefly outline the history of Hindu Muslim relations in India.
A brief overview of Hindu Muslim relations in India
The history of communalism in India is linked to colonialism and the political context it
generated. One of the first branches of history writing to highlight the tensions between
Hindus and Muslims was British colonial historiography. The dominant trend in this
writing by the end of the 19th century was what Veena Das calls ‘the colonial riot
narrative’, which presented most events, regardless of the issue concerned, as a case of
religious conflict between Hindus and Muslims (Das, 1995; Pandey in Das, 1995:42-43).
Thus, this perspective essentialized the relationships between people of differing religious
persuasions to make the case that Hindu-Muslim interaction in India was dominated by
feelings of religious hatred and conflict.
The nationalist movements that developed in pre independent India sought to glorify the
Indian past to oppose colonial constructions of a backward country. However, the
nationalist discourse absorbed many of the biases of the colonial discourse it opposed.
Gyanendra Pandey, a historian who has written extensively on the history of communalism
in India, shows that the history of nationalism in India is linked to the history of
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communalism. The nationalist discourse, he argues, with its need to construct a core or a
mainstream of the nation, drew sharp boundaries between communities. The following
quote by him sheds light on the Indian case:
“… It was in the particular context of 1947 – building on more than a century
of colonial governance premised on the division between Hindus and Muslims, and
on an extended (and oft-retold) history of Muslim adventurers raiding the land,
settling and setting up towns and kingdoms in which the question of religious and
ethnic identities became important political issues – that the “we” of Indian
nationalism came to be elaborated, and the Muslims came to be marked out as a
minority …”(Pandey,1999: 625).
Thus, the forces of colonialism, nationalism and communalism are inextricably intertwined
in the history of India. All these discourses draw boundaries between Hindus and Muslims
in India, albeit in different ways and in differing degrees. The British colonial policy of
divide-and-rule and the development of Hindu and Muslim communal politics culminated
in the partition of India on communal lines in 1947 into an Islamic Pakistan and a secular
India.
In India today, Hindus constitute a religious majority of approximately 80% of the
population, while Muslims constitute the largest minority of approximately 13% of the
population (Census of India, 2001). The population of Muslims is dispersed all over the
country, and has large concentrations in the states of Jammu and Kashmir and West
Bengal, with lower concentrations in other areas. In riot-prone regions like Maharashtra
and Gujarat, the Muslims constitute a minority of less than 20 per cent of the population.
On an average, Muslims are of a lower income bracket than Hindus (Frøystad, 2009: 444).
Other religious minorities in India include Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Parsees, Jews and
others. While communal tensions are not limited to differences between Hindus and
Muslims, the history of partition has ensured that Hindu-Muslim conflict is an enduring
problem in India today.
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Since 1947, communal riots between Hindus and Muslims and anti-Muslim pogroms have
been endemic in India (Brass, 2003:6). One major landmark was the violence that occurred
in various parts of the country following the demolition of the Babri Masjid (Mosque) in
Ayodhya, India on 6th December 1992, and the riots that followed in Bombay. A decade
later, in 2002, another landmark case of communal violence was witnessed in Gujarat,
which is the case discussed in this thesis.
The state of Gujarat4:
Gujarat has witnessed several incidents of violence in post independent India (Pillai, 2006:
19). The presence of the Hindu Right in Gujarat dates back to the 1950s, and the
movement gathered a great deal of strength by mobilising largely upper caste support in
the 1960s. Major landmarks of communal violence include the riots in the city of
Ahmedabad in 1969. Another case was the widespread violence all over Gujarat in 1993
that occurred in the wake of the demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. A report by
an organisation called the People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) states that in
both cases, the damage and losses in the Muslim community were way higher than those
amongst the Hindu community. Another instance of violence in 2000 witnessed the
systematic destruction of Muslim property by members of Hindu Right organisations
(PUDR, 2002: 64-66). The same pattern of systematic targeting of Muslim lives and
property was also seen in 2002, which is the case discussed in this study. When the
violence broke out, the political face of the Hindu Right, a political party called the BJP
(Bhartiya Janata Party) was in power.
4
‘State’ is an administrative division. Gujarat is one of the 28 states of the Republic of India, and is located
in the Western part of the country. Refer to Appendix B (Map of India showing Gujarat).
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The Hindu Right in India
There are a number of Hindu Right organizations in India today, which are collectively
organized into a coalition called the Sangh Parivar (the Family of Associations). These
include:
 The RSS (The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh). It describes itself as a cultural
organization, with its main task being “character building” (Mathur, 2008:81-82).
It operates through the disseminating mechanism of its branches or shakhas, which
are spread all over India, and operate on a daily basis. Different shakhas operate
for different age groups. Here, children and adults are taught to use weapons such
as lathis (sticks, swords etc.), and they learn about nationalist Hindu heroes
(Mathur, 2008: 88-100). These shakhas are perhaps the best example of the
everyday life of Hindu nationalism.
 The BJP (the Bharatiya Janata Party), a political party. It was in power both in the
state of Gujarat as well as at the national level during Gujarat 2002. It is still in
power in Gujarat, though not at the national level.
 The ABVP (the Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad), the All India Students
Council.
 The VHP or Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council), which works in the
field of ‘religion and social work.’
 Apart from this, there are various organizations working with women, tribal
people, lower castes, labourers and other social groups.
Thus, the mass base of the Hindu Right organizations in India is wide and varied. What
unites these varied organisations into one coalition? Shubh Mathur has argued that the
unifying factor in the ideology of the Hindu Right is not the exact nature of Hindu identity,
but a hatred of religious minorities (Mathur, 2008: 53). Due to the peculiar history of the
Indian subcontinent, Muslims feel the brunt of this hatred the most. How is this hatred of
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Muslims created, propagated and reinforced by these organizations? How can one begin to
understand this Islamophobic ideology? The next chapter outlines the methodological and
analytical approaches chosen in this study.
Chapter 3 looks at the cultural content of the Hindu Right discourse in the public sphere in
Gujarat. It presents the cultural signs and narratives associated with the violence in
different categories and discusses them systematically. The analysis in Chapter 3 is micro
analysis in that it is specific to the cultural signs presented. Based on this, Chapter 4 draws
more general conclusions about the cultural aspect and the use of signs in the Hindu Right
discourse (macro analysis). Conclusions regarding the impact of dehumanization on
various aspects of society are provided in Chapter 5. This chapter also presents some
conclusions on Islamophobia in India, and discusses possible parallels for analysis.
Chapter 6 gives some recommendations for further research. Keeping the practical aspect
of the study in mind, it also discusses the applicability of the human rights framework to
countering processes of dehumanization in society, and suggests alternative strategies and
approaches that might help in ensuring the more effective implementation of human rights.
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Chapter 2
Methodology and Analytical Framework
2.1. Sources and Methodology
My initial research questions (articulated on page 2 and 3 in the Introduction) were formed
during my visit to Gujarat in the summer of 2003. To answer these questions, I have turned
to a variety of sources.
This study is based almost exclusively on secondary sources. The main sources of material
on the case study used are human rights and other civil society reports published by
various national and international bodies. In addition, some news coverage available online
has been used. I have supplemented these secondary sources by using notes drawn from
my experiences as an activist, as well as conversations I have had with several people from
Gujarat to gauge their opinions about the violence.
Most of these sources are one sided in that they take a clear partisan position in
condemning the violence and the state of Gujarat. Further, most of them are either written
from, or lean towards a human rights perspective. Keeping this in mind, I have attempted
to use these sources critically. At the same time, however, this study also takes a partisan
position in that it leans towards a human rights perspective.
The available material has been used to identify a variety of cultural expressions associated
with the violence afloat in the Hindu Right public discourse. Using a perspective of
discourse analysis, these expressions have been categorised and analysed with the help of
academic literature on Hindu Muslim conflict and literature drawn from the field of
violence studies. A detailed review of this literature follows in the next section.
13
2.2. Analytical Framework
This section examines a few concepts that are central to the analysis in this study.
Violence
A number of important questions come to mind regarding the nature of mass violence.
What, for instances, causes such violence? Can one factor, such as the lack of civic
engagement between two communities, explain the outbreak of violence (Varshney,
2001:363)? Further, is the term ‘outbreak’ appropriate for understanding how this violence
breaks out: that is, can it be understood as spontaneous, a sudden eruption? If yes, then are
these eruptions aberrations, shocking occurrences that disrupt the peace of daily life? This
is a view that stems from a long-standing argument in the field of genocide studies that
views the Jewish Holocaust as a unique case (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004: 19-20).
Viewed from this perspective, cases such as Gujarat can be classified as exceptional
occurrences detached from daily life.
An understanding of mass violence as spontaneous stems from a long tradition in social
psychology, first articulated by Gustave Le Bon that views ‘crowds’ as easily swayed by
passion and hysteria.5 As Gupta argues, perspectives influenced by this idea view cases of
mass violence as occurrences in which primordial passions are inflamed and ‘boil over’
(Gupta, 2007:34).
Ashutosh Varshney, in his study of causation in Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, stresses
the nature of civic engagement between the two communities as an important factor in
inter-community relations. He postulates that in cases where there is frequent civic
engagement (such as professional associations, networking, community interaction)
between Hindus and Muslims, conflict is not likely to occur. Consequently, he argues, the
5
See: Le Bon [1896] (2001) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. Kitchener: Batoche Books.
Available online at: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/lebon/Crowds.pdf
14
absence of civic engagement between Hindus and Muslims leads to situations in which
conflict is more likely (Varshney, 2001). I see Varshney’s explanation as supporting a
view of violence as spontaneous. His argument seems to imply that the absence of civic
engagement would lead to automatic outbreaks of spontaneous violence. Thus, the search
for mono causal explanations feeds into a primordial view of violence.
On the other hand, one can look at acts of violence as a continuum, and therefore view
violence in everyday life as linked to large scale instances of violence. Scholars such as
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004: 19-20), and Raka Ray (2007: 87) have argued that
there is a link between everyday and large scale occurrences of violence. This is the link
that this study attempts to explore further by trying to examine what role cultural signs
play in normalizing and ritualizing violence and thus enabling the outbreak of a pogrom.
Scholars such as Tambiah and Brass, who have worked extensively on Hindu Muslim
violence in India, have postulated that such cases of collective communal violence in India
are to some degree routinized and ritualized (Tambiah, 1990:755; Brass, 2003:30). I quote
Tambiah:
“...ethnic conflicts are occurrences that, up to a point, are staged, that by virtue of
repetition acquire stereotypical features, and in which antecedent happenings
become precedents for later orchestrations.” (Tambiah, 1990:755).
Thus, Tambiah takes an instrumentalist view of ethnic violence by arguing that ‘riots’ are
in fact often planned and pre-meditated. Spontaneity is often used as an excuse to cover up
the political crafting behind such violence. Taking this argument as a point of departure,
this study is based on the assumption that mass violence is complex and multi faceted, and
pre planned up to some degree. Given such a scenario, this project attempts to understand
the role cultural signs play in the pre planned as well spontaneous aspects of such violence.
That is to say, it examines how cultural signs structure and shape the actual events of the
violence.
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In doing this, this dissertation uses the analogy Brass has drawn between the production of
communal violence in India and the production of stage dramas. He says that riots can be
likened to stage productions which have distinct phases: the preparation stage, in which
leaders (politicians and others) decide how to attack, followed by an activation/enactment
stage in which the actual violence is carried out. The third and last stage is
explanation/interpretation, which is the political debate that follows communal violence, in
which the violence is interpreted and the responsibility for the violence is determined.
Brass argues that this stage is characterised by a blurring of agency and what he calls
‘blame displacement’, which I will return to in a later chapter (Brass in Frøystad,
2009:445). This dissertation focuses on two of these stages – the enactment and the
subsequent contextualisation of the violence – and tries to see how cultural signs and
narratives shape both these stages of the violence.
Discourse
In order to locate cultural signs in the violence, one has to try and understand them in the
context of the discourse which propagates them. This study therefore focuses on the Hindu
Right discourse and tries to analyse it critically to understand its features, logic and
operation in India. The point of departure here is Apter’s definition of political discourse
and political discourse theory:
“Discourse in general is a way of organizing human experience. It establishes
frames of meaning by the recounting and interpreting of events and situations. It
constructs systems of order. Political discourse applies such frames to the exercise
of power – including principles of hierarchy, representation and accountability…As
a form of critique, [modern political discourse theory] tries to penetrate below the
surface of the good stories that people tell themselves about politics…”(Apter,
2004: 11644).
This endeavour of questioning and understanding such ‘good stories’ and grand narratives
is what this study hopes to contribute to. In the grand narratives of discourses that
construct community identity (such as Hindu, Muslim, Arabic, Jewish etc.), culture is an
important aspect. The emphasis on a common culture, shared traditions and social values
unique to a community is important in the construction of community identity. In
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traditional sociological theory, a community is often defined by two main aspects. The first
is its common culture .i.e. the community is seen as the sphere of face-to-face relations and
interaction where a common, shared worldview of the community is created (Das, 1995:
50). The focus here is on intra-community interaction, and how that shapes culture. The
second aspect of constructing collective identity involves defining the self vis-à-vis ‘the
other’, whereby a community defines itself and its culture in contrast to other communities
(Cohen in Saugestad, 1982:134). Thus, the definition of the self as different from others is
an important part of constructing one’s identity. This study thus looks at the cultural aspect
of the Hindu Right discourse, and tries to penetrate its understanding of a common Hindu
culture as unique and different from other cultures.
Apart from analysing these ‘good stories’, this study also tries to question the bad stories
that such discourses tell about ‘the other.’ That is, it looks at the negative aspect of how
discourses construct community identity. Veena Das has pointed out that often, there are
violent and homogenizing tendencies involved in defining and drawing the boundaries of a
collective (community) (Das, 1995: 10). The need of the community to define the
imagined self as unique can lead to defining “the other” not just in contrast to, but in
opposition to the self. Thus, culture not only defines common identity, but also social
boundaries.
This link between culture and social boundaries has been explored by Sidsel Saugestad in
her work on the symbols and metaphors that prescribe community identity and social
boundaries (Catholic vs. Protestant) in Northern Ireland (Saugestad, 1982). Based on her
work, this study takes a similar approach in that it looks at how boundaries that express
social differences between groups are created and maintained. For the purpose of such an
analysis, the conflicting identities of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ can be viewed as ethnic
groups. In Saugestad’s categorisation of the identities ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ in
Northern Ireland as ethnic groups in conflict, she draws on Barth’s (1969) definition of
ethnic groups as groups that define themselves as, and are also defined by others as unique
and different from other social groups (Saugestad, 1982: 134). The expression of
community identity in such cases is not based so much on an understanding of a shared
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culture and common traditions, but on the boundaries that define the self vis-à-vis the
other.
Das has pointed out that community discourse not only defines itself in opposition to ‘the
other’, but often engages in violence against this “other” (another community) to maintain
these constructed boundaries (Das, 1995:10, 15). Thus, discourse that shapes community
identity may be based on a dehumanization of, and following from that, violence against,
the other. Shubh Mathur’s study of the Hindu Right discourse in Rajasthan analyses the
cultural domain of such violence and looks at how negative definitions of ‘the other’ can
penetrate the everyday life and commonsense understanding of a community (Mathur,
2008). This dissertation draws upon her work to understand how inter ethnic violence can
be normalized.
The impact of the negative, violent aspect of cultural discourse and identity construction
should not be underestimated, for it implies that words can kill (Apter, 2004: 11644). What
are these words? What is the content of such discourse? The next chapter examines the
content of the Hindu Right discourse in the context of the violence in Gujarat in 2002.
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Chapter 3
Cultural Signs and Narratives: Micro Analysis
“… Ancient wrongs, real and imagined, were sought to be collectively avenged by the
savage violation of the rights of a living, demonised “enemy”. There has been an
appalling emotional partitioning of minds into “we” and “they” among all too many
across Gujarat and elsewhere in India…” (Editor’s Guild of India, 2002:22).
3.1. Introduction
The above quote illustrates how social boundaries between communities, when taken to an
extreme, can result in violence. This chapter looks at the cultural content of the Hindu
Right discourse in the public sphere in Gujarat to understand how it expresses these social
boundaries vis-à-vis ‘the other’ .i.e. the Muslim community. It presents the cultural signs
and symbols associated with the violence in different categories and discusses them one by
one. The analysis presented in this chapter is micro analysis in that it is specific to the
cultural signs presented here. A more general (macro) analysis follows in the next chapter.
Ordinary cultural signs that are part of everyday life often acquire an extraordinary
meaning or significance during situations of conflict. Since the violence in Gujarat was
carried out in the name of religion, several cultural signs that are part of daily life took on
an added meaning as markers of religious identity. Further, these signs were those that
were seen as expressing differences between the two communities. The following quote
sheds light on this:
“…The features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’
differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant. The
cultural contents of ethnic dichotomies would seem analytically to be of two
orders: (i) overt signals or signs – the diacritical features that people look for and
exhibit to show identity, often such features as dress, house-form, or general style
of life, and (ii) basic value orientation: the standards of morality and excellence by
which performance is judged.” (Barth in Saugestad, 1982: 135-136).
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This means that many of the symbols used by the Hindu Right discourse do not necessarily
express religious hostility as such, but are seen by the actors involved as doing so. Further,
as Barth says in the above quote, these signs have both overt (visible, tangible) aspects, as
well as covert (invisible and intangible) aspects. The signs related to the violence in
Gujarat have both these aspects. Keeping this in mind, let us now turn to a discussion of
these signs. For the sake of clarity, these signs have been categorised and discussed under
four separate headings: visual symbols, verbal discourse, written discourse and lastly,
terminology and metaphors. However, these categories are not mutually exclusive and
overlap to a great extent. Further, the categories and examples listed here do not cover the
entire range of cultural signs, but represent a sample of such cultural signs. In this sample,
I have tried to focus on those signs that I felt illustrate the actors’ perceptions of their
victims, as well as their views on the violence they were executing.
3.2. Visual Symbols
The visual symbols are all tangible ones, and are therefore seen as expressing cultural
differences in an overt manner.
Religious structures:
Religious structures are one of the most obvious targets of attack in cases of communal
violence. The demolition of a religious structure is a physical and symbolic way of
degrading the other community’s religion, offending its religious sentiments and
establishing a symbolic victory over ‘the other’s’ religion. The demolition of the Babri
Masjid (Mosque) in Ayodhya in Dec 1992 is perhaps one of the best examples of this. The
demolition of this 500 year old mosque sparked one of the most horrible cases of
communal violence in the country.
The same pattern was seen in Gujarat: often, mosques were attacked before any other form
of violence was carried out. It has been estimated that approximately 240 Muslim
mosques, shrines, graveyards etc. were vandalised in various parts of Gujarat (Editors
Guild, 2002: 6). Further, these holy sites were desecrated before being burnt or demolished
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in several places. For instance, a report published by an NGO called the Peoples Union for
Democratic Rights (PUDR) notes that in Sanjeli (in District Dahod), where the mosque
was broken and set on fire, abusive slogans against Muslims were found written on the
walls (PUDR, 2002: 31). Saffron flags and images and idols of the Hindu god Hanuman6
were installed (Editors Guild, 2002: 6; PUDR, 2002:31). PUDR argues that the symbolic
desecration carried out before the actual destruction of mosques is indicative of a
“...systematic attempt to stamp out the cultural identity of Muslims...” (PUDR, 2002: 31).
Colour:
The colour green is known to be the colour of Islam in the Indian subcontinent7. However,
the link between the colour and Islam is not automatic, and does not apply to every
context. Green is also the colour of fertility, and also just another colour of the clothes
people wear. During the violence in Gujarat, however, it acquired a special significance as
an almost exclusive marker of the Islamic identity. I will illustrate this by recalling an
instance from my personal experience in Gujarat in 2003, a year after the killings.
Walking down the road with a friend in Ahmedabad city, I suddenly realised that we were
receiving a lot of hostile stares from people on the road. We wondered about it for a while,
and then it slowly dawned on us that it was possibly because I had a green shirt on, along
with a green stone pendant around my neck. Feeling increasingly scared, we decided to run
for it after a while. A few of the people we met in Gujarat also said that they realised that
they received hostile stares if they happened to be wearing green shirts.
The colour saffron, on the other hand, is portrayed by the Hindu Right as representative of
the Hindu identity. In general, the colour saffron is so prominent in Hindutva campaigns
6
Hanuman is a Hindu god who features along with the god Ram in the epic Ramayana. Ram and Hanuman
are prominent symbols of the Hindutva movement.
7
The flag of the Islamic state of Pakistan, for instance, has green in it since the colour is associated with
Islam.
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that Hindu Right nationalism is often called saffron nationalism. During the violence,
several of the attackers wore saffron bands or scarves. For instance, eyewitnesses of the
violence in a village called Pandarwada8 reported that a car filled with men who wore
saffron dupattas (long scarves) drove around the village and supervised the murders
(PUDR, 2002:8). Thus, in the context of the violence, the colours green and saffron were
not merely expressions of religious identity and difference, but also of religious enmity and
violence.
Other tangible signals:
The above examples indicate that the violence was not just physical, but also symbolic in
that it sought to establish the supremacy of ‘Hindu’ cultural identity over the Muslim.
Other incidents indicate this as well:
One of the instances of mass killing reported from the village of Delol (in the District
Panchmahals) was the hacking and burning to death of ten people. The dead bodies were
piled up and set on fire. This represented a symbolic act of conversion, since Hindus and
Muslims follow different death rituals. While Muslims bury their dead, Hindus cremate the
body. Two young boys, aged ten and twelve, were forced to go around the fire and shout
‘Jai Shree Ram’9 (‘Victory to Lord Ram’) before being shoved into the pyre (PUDR, 2002:
11).
In months following the violence, several Muslims stayed on in relief camps out of fear. In
May 2002, the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights reported that:
“...Threats issued to many Muslims trying to go back to their villages hinge upon
8
Pandarwada is located in District Panchmahals and has around 500-600 Hindu families and approximately
70-80 Muslim families (PUDR, 2002: 7).
9 Ram is a Hindu god who features prominently in the Hindu Right discourse in India.
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their stopping the use of cultural symbols, even caps and beards for men10 and
salwar kameez11 for women.”(PUDR, 2002:31).
Such overt threats regarding symbols that are considered markers of Muslim identity and
the ritual acts of symbolic conversion during the violence indicate that there is a direct link




Slogans feature repeatedly in the memory of eyewitness and survivor testimonies. Some examples
follow:
“Babar ke aulad”
The Editors’ Guild fact finding mission reports that Muslims were referred to as “Babar ke
aulad” (Editors Guild, 2002: 4). Literally translated, this phrase reads as ‘children of
Babar’.
Babar was a Mughal emperor who founded the Mughal empire in 1526 AD, which
flourished in what are now large parts of the Indian subcontinent from the mid-16th to the
mid-19th century AD. Since Islam came to India only in the middle ages,12 a common
argument of the Hindu Right discourse is that Islam is a ‘foreign’ religion that spread in
10
‘Caps’ here refers to the white cap worn by Muslim men while praying. ‘The beard’ here represents
another stereotype which says that all Muslim men have beards. In fact, the beard is not an exclusive
indicator of religious identity in the Indian subcontinent. Several Hindu and Muslim men have beards, and
several do not.
11
The salwar kameez is a traditional garment worn by women in several parts of India. Again, the idea that
only Muslims wear salwaar kameez is a stereotype. The salwar kameez is worn by many non-Muslims
(including Hindus) in several parts of India.
12
The first period of Islamic rule started in the 13
th
c. with the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, the
rulers of which came from Central Asia.
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India at the point of sword. The period when Islam came to India is commonly portrayed
as a dark age that brought about the downfall of Hindu civilisation. Islamic kings are said
to have plundered Hindu temples and destroyed them mercilessly (Puniyani, 2003: 83-87).
The use of Babar’s name in this phrase is thus a sample of this larger argument.
The phrase raises some interesting points. The reference to a historical figure so far back in
time seems to illustrate that in the attackers’ imagination, the violence they are carrying out
is directly linked to history. Given the Hindu Right’s version of history, which is clearly
linear, the acts of violence executed are likely to be seen as retaliatory or revenge for the
ancient wrongs carried out by Muslims on the Hindu civilisation. I will dwell further on
this sense of history in the next chapter.
“We are willing to do anything for Hindustan/India”
The Editor-in-Chief of Sandesh, a Gujarati (vernacular) newspaper that was widely
criticised for coverage favouring the Hindu Right during the carnage, told a fact finding
mission that he felt that the reaction to the train burning in Godhra was justified.13He is
also quoted to have said: “Hindustan ke naam per kuch bhi karenge”/ “We are willing to
do anything for Hindustan/India” (Editors Guild, 2002: 5).
This phrase is clearly a nationalist one. The violence against Muslims was thus carried out
in the name of this nation: the presumption here is that this nation is a Hindu nation, either
made up exclusively of or at least dominated by Hindus14. I will dwell further on this
variant of nationalism in the next chapter.
13
The reaction’ here refers to the mass killings in Gujarat.
14 The idea of Hindu rashtra or Hindu nation is an important cornerstone of the Hindutva ideology.
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Rumours and Myths:
Recollections about rumours and myths abound in the accounts given by eyewitnesses of
the violence. These existed in both the written and verbal forms, and some of the spread of
misinformation was amazingly well organized.
In Pandarwada village for example, Faiz Mohammad Ahmadbhai (a Muslim eyewitness),
mentioned a huge meeting in which villagers from 50-60 villages gathered just two weeks
before the attacks started:
“Nearly 300 to 400 people from the nearby villages, men and women, had collected
at the meeting. There were VHP15leaders, sadhus [saints] and others. The entire
meeting was broadcast on the loudspeakers….One leader said, ‘…The Muslim
population is increasing. We must do something now. We have no arms. In Muslim
houses arms are ready for use. We must prepare to fight them…’ The Muslims
don’t believe in family planning so their population increases. Let our population
also increase…” (Mohammad Ahmadbhai in PUDR, 2002: 27, emphasis added).
This account indicates a few important things: firstly, the fact that the meeting was
organised in advance and was addressed by leaders of the VHP indicates that some of the
propaganda that spread rumours and myths about Muslims before the violence was well
organised. Paul Brass has spoken about two types of rumours in his analysis of the role of
rumour in communal violence. He says that while gossip mongering in general may have
no role in mobilizing people to act violently, there is also organised and specialized
production of rumours designed with the specific purpose of mobilising violent crowds
(Brass, 2003:361). Using this classification, the speech quoted above clearly falls into the
latter category. That is to say, rumours that demonise Muslims in this way are intentionally
spread.
15
The VHP: The Vishwa Hindu Parishad or the World Hindu Council. It is a sister organization of the BJP, the
political party in power both in the state as well as the centre during the violence in 2002.
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Secondly, the references to increasing Muslim population and possession of arms seem to
imply that there is a Muslim conspiracy to dominate and/or kill Hindus. Such propaganda
is likely to have aided in creating fear and hatred towards the Muslims amongst the Hindu
community. Lastly, the speech has a clear tone of urgency to it in that it urges Hindus to
act with immediate effect to defend themselves. Keeping in mind that at least 38 Muslims
were killed in Pandarwada just two weeks after this meeting, the speech can be read as a
directly inciting violence. Other rumours such as “…Hindu women being violated by




Pamphleteering played an important role in the violence, and there were several different
pamphlets in circulation (PUCL-Vadodara and Shanti Abhiyan, 2002:150)16. A glance at
some of the pamphlets in circulation indicates that rumours and myths were not just
propagated verbally, but also in the written form.
The following extract is from a four-page long pamphlet that was circulated in the city of
Ahmedabad. Circulated by the VHP, the pamphlet appealed for funds to provide security
for Hindus. It says:
“… Your life is in danger, you can be murdered any time…We are collecting funds
for securing the interests of the Hindus….there are thousands of more Godhra
carnages being planned.” (Times of India, April 26, 2002 in Editor’s Guild, 2002:
14).
The language of the quote creates a clear dividing line between a Muslim community
gearing up to attack and a Hindu community under threat. Creating an atmosphere of fear
16 PUCL-Vadodara and Shanti Abhiyan is an NGO based in Gujarat.
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and tension, this quote places the responsibility for the uncertainty in the air on the Muslim
community. In other words, it paints a picture of Muslims as aggressors inciting the
violence.
Print Media:
Sections of the vernacular press in Gujarat, especially two newspapers: the Sandesh and
the Gujarat Samachar, have been condemned for playing a provocative role in the
violence17. The role of these two newspapers is especially significant since they have a
large readership: Gujarat Samachar has approximately 8.10 lakh (810000) readers, while
Sandesh has a readership of approximately 7.05 lakhs (705 000) (Editors Guild, 2002: 2-
6).
Just a few days after the Godhra incident, an article in Sandesh carried the following title
in block letters:
“THE GODHRA INCIDENT IS NOT COMMUNALISM, IT IS THE BLACK
SHADOW OF TERRORISM” (Sandesh, 1 March 2002 in PUCL-Vadodara and
Shanti-Abhiyan, 2002: 154).
This headline portrays the Muslims as terrorists. The Muslim-terrorist-aggressor equation
reminds one of Islamophobic rhetoric in the West, especially post the attacks on September
11, 2002 in the United States of America.
Interestingly enough, Sandesh’s circulation increased by approximately 150,000 copies
after the riots began, which was probably due to its pro-Hindu stance (Editors Guild, 2002:
6). The increase in the popularity of the newspaper indicates that the messages
communicated by the newspaper were accepted by at least some parts of the Hindu
community in Gujarat. On this basis, one can conclude that the anti Muslim discourse was
effective to at least some extent.
17
The same report that condemns the role of Sandesh and Gujarat Samachar concludes that otherwise, the
overall role of both the local and national media in the Gujarat carnage was neutral (Editor’s Guild. 2002).
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School Textbooks:
Post the violence in Gujarat, there was much talk in India about the communalisation of
the education system in Gujarat. Analyses of the social science textbooks prescribed by the
Gujarat State Board of School Textbooks were criticised for being substandard and biased
(Editors Guild, 2002: 17).
For instance, Chapter 9 in the Social Studies textbook for Standard 9 is titled “Problems of
the Country and their Solutions” and reads:
“..Apart from the Muslims, even the Christians, Parsees and other foreigners are
also recognised as the minority communities. In most of the states the Hindus are
in a minority and Muslims, Christians and Sikhs are a majority in these respective
states.”(Social Studies textbook, Std. IX in Editors Guild, 2002: 17, emphases
added).
The use of the term ‘foreigner’ to refer to minorities in the country invokes the idea that
Hindus are somehow the genuine, authentic inhabitants of India. Apart from this bias, this
paragraph is also factually incorrect and self contradictory: while on the one hand, it lists
the Muslim, Sikh and Christian communities as minorities, it then claims that Hindus are a
minority in most parts of India18. This factually incorrect statement seems to be
deliberately designed to give the impression of a majority of Hindus who are left to the
mercy of ‘foreigners’ in their homeland.
A report by an organisation called the Citizens’ Initiative points out that the Social Studies
textbook for Standard 10 presents a rather uncritical view of fascism and Nazism, and
glorifies Hitler. Hitler is praised for lending “dignity and prestige to the German
government.”(Social Studies textbook, Std. X in Citizens’ Initiative, 2002:1). Such
glorification implies that the textbooks promote a militant nationalism.
18 Hindus form a majority of approximately 80 per cent of the population in India.
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3.5. Terminology and Metaphors
The previous two sections have examined samples of language used in the Hindutva
violence in the verbal and the written form. This section looks at examples of more
condensed usage of language, and focuses on specific terminology and phrases.
Names:
Names in India can sometimes, though not always, indicate religious identity. During the
violence, disclosing one’s name if one was a Muslim would have been foolhardy.
The following quote is by Sahir Raza, an eyewitness to the violence. Sahir was 14 years
old when the violence broke out. Being the son of activists, he accompanied his parents to
Gujarat, and shot the carnage on his camera. Though not a Muslim by persuasion, his name
‘Sahir Raza’ would spell ‘Muslim’ to the attackers. Recalling the precautions he had to
take, he recalls:
“The very first instruction my mother gave me on the morning of 30th march 2002
was that my name was Sahil Raja for the next few weeks. To a 14 year old boy,
this instruction didn't make much sense…..however, with the approach into the
city, the burnt houses, the empty streets and the smell of charred meat the fear
flooded in… being forced to change my name to stay alive was one of the hardest
and most humiliating things I have ever gone through.”(Sahir Raza, personal
communication, 2009, emphasis added)
Sahir’s experience is not atypical, and the theme of names as identification runs through
several testimonies19. However, as in Sahir’s case, not everyone with a so called ‘Muslim
name’ in India is a Muslim. Thus, a lot of the violence ‘missed its mark’, so to speak, by
threatening people who were non Muslims. This demonstrates the problems with reducing
something as fluid and intangible as cultural or religious identity to a stereotyped checklist
19
A report on Gujarat by the Citizen’s Initiative says that “The entitlement to a Muslim name has….
threatened the right to the Indian nationality.”(Citizen’s Initiative, 2002:5).
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such as name, colour, beard etc. This quote also gives us a hint about the victim’s
experiences and the humiliation associated with the act of having to hide or deny one’s
cultural identity to stay alive.
Metaphors:
‘Slap’: a metaphor for the killings
Sociologist Raka Ray has analysed an article on Hindunet.org20 that surfaced online after
the killings in Gujarat. This online article, written by a columnist who is a supporter of the
Hindutva ideology describes the events following the Godhra incident:
“Somebody out there has been slapped twice. The first slap was the violent
retaliation that spread in other parts of Gujarat. The second, more powerful slap
was delivered through non-violent means: through the ballot21. Both ballot and
bullet have had their say. If there were any anti-national forces out there that
planned to destabilize India through sudden and sporadic attacks on civilians, they
must be doing a serious rethink now…” (Jagtiani in Ray, 2007: 83).
Ray dwells on the metaphor of slap here, explaining that the violence following the Godhra
incident in Gujarat is seen as a retaliatory slap (expressed in terms of physical violence)
from ‘the Hindu nation’ towards the Muslims for the Godhra incident. The metaphor of
slap is particularly significant here, Ray argues, because a slap differs from other forms of
violence(say, a kick or a punch), since the purpose of the slap is not so much to harm
physically as it is to humiliate (Ray, 2007: 88).
She goes on to argue that this metaphor has particular significance for Hindutva ideology,
which plays on the image of the hyper masculine Muslim who has supposedly raped and
20
www.hindunet.org is a pro-Hindutva website
21
This ‘second slap’ refers to the re election of Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2002. Modi
was widely criticized for his role in inciting and justifying the violence, as well as for the inaction of the State
government under him (see Appendix A). Modi was reelected Chief Minister in Dec. 2002, and again for a
third term in Dec. 2007. The BJP government under Modi is thus still in power in Gujarat.
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humiliated the body of the Hindu nation in the past (Ray, 2007: 95). That is, the Muslim is
a foreigner who has insulted and degraded the body of ‘Mother India’22.This imagined
enemy must be retaliated to, be ‘slapped back’ by the Hindu nation. The violence against
the Muslims is thus construed as a retaliation, a resistance against the centuries of
‘foreign’ domination. This slap is a demonstration of the strength and power of the ‘Hindu
nation’ (Ray, 2007: 95).
In other words, the purpose of the slap is clearly to avenge and humiliate the ‘other’ and
demonstrate one’s own prowess. By demonstrating prowess, one establishes a hierarchy
between the self and the other by asserting one’s own superiority. Thus, the metaphor of
slap seeks to establish inequality between the self and ‘the other’, a physical as well as
moral superiority. This hierarchy has a gendered aspect to it: the Hindu male has to shed
his ‘weakness’ and display strength and aggression in order to reclaim his mother land
from the aggressive, foreign Muslim (Ray, 2007: 88, 95-96). The idea of being strong and
establishing one’s superiority over ‘the other’ is closely linked to the idea of proving one’s
masculinity.
Mini Pakistan: a metaphor for Muslim localities
The term ‘mini Pakistan’ has become a common term for Muslim localities in Hindutva
parlance. The locality of Juhapura for instance, located on the southern outskirts of the city
of Ahmedabad, is home to 400,000 Muslims, and is thus called ‘Mini Pakistan’. The
following testimony by Mohsin, a resident of Juhapura, demonstrates the tension between
the two communities:
“You can see the “border” from our windows….there is a wall between our
Juhapura and the Hindu Jivaraj area. The Bajrang Dal, with talwars [swords] and
kesri patties [saffron bands] came from there and cut up Muslims here. The police
too stood on that side of the border and tear gassed and fired shots into this side….”
(Mohsin in the Rang Avadoot Camp, Juhapura, May 5th 2002 in Citizen’s Initiative,
2002: 4).
22 ‘Mother India’ is a common metaphor for the nation in Hindi. The nation is referred to as the motherland.
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The ‘border’ here is a physical expression of the ghettoization and division between the
two communities. The fact that Juhapura is called ‘Mini Pakistan’ implies that ‘the border’
is a metaphor for the border between India and Pakistan. During the violence, the ‘Hindu
nation’, with all the symbols appropriated in its name, such as saffron bands and swords by
the Hindutva forces, crossed this border to attack the ‘foreign’ enemy. The metaphors of
‘mini Pakistan’ and ‘border’ invoke memories of the Partition of 1947 and the ‘enemy’
across the border. The use of swords indicates the militant nature of the hostility of
Hindutva nationalism towards its enemies, the Muslims.
***
The sample of signs presented above in this chapter gives us an idea of the Hindu Right
discourse and the prominence of cultural signs in such discourse. The case of the Hindu
discourse illustrates common communication strategies used by discourses on community
identity in general in expressing social boundaries and defining the self vis-à-vis ‘the
other.’ The varied techniques of communication: visual, verbal and written help in
penetrating various aspects of daily life and thus give such discourse an all encompassing
nature. The power of such discourse also lies in its normality: the everyday character of the
symbols and signs it draws on makes it an effective mechanism of communication to
mobilise an audience and hence construct community identity. What is the nature of the
community identity reflected in and shaped by such discourse? The next chapter pieces the
fragments of cultural signs and narratives together to form a more holistic picture of the
Hindutva discourse and the community identity it constructs, as well as the exact role such
discourse may play in enabling and justifying mass violence.
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Chapter 4
Discourse and Violence: Macro Analysis
4.1. Features of the Hindu Right Discourse
A key term in the analysis of this study is ‘discourse’, which is seen as a way of organizing
human experience. A discourse constructs its own worldview and systems of order’ i.e. it
defines right and wrong, demarcates social boundaries and establishes hierarchies (Apter,
2004: 11644). The previous chapter shows that the Hindu Right discourse is rich in cultural
content. Both tangible and intangible aspects: that is, both concrete cultural symbols and
narratives shape the worldview of this discourse and consequently, the actors it influences.
The present chapter analyses how this discourse constructs Hindu community identity,
which is expressed in terms of the idea of a Hindu nation. The idea of this Hindu nation
finds concrete expression in the physical space of the current nation of India, which it
claims as its rightful territory. The idea and this claim is justified by drawing on narratives
of both the past and the present. ‘The past’ here refers to the strong sense of history that
permeates the Hindutva discourse, while the present refers to the (continued) existence of
an enemy that exists both within the borders of ‘the Hindu nation’ (India) and across the
border (the Islamic nation state of Pakistan). A closer look at the notions of the past and
the present help in understanding how they shape the ‘Hindu’ community identity in this
discourse.
The past in the present
The discourse conceptualises a glorified past of a five thousand year-old ‘Hindu nation’.
Thus, the nation-state is equated with religion, and India is seen as a land belonging
exclusively to Hindus, in which the entry of Islam was an invasion (Puniyani, 2003: 33,
41). Linked to the idea of this invasive Islam is the idea of Hindu tolerance, which has
historically led to the subjugation of the tolerant and peace loving Hindu at the hands of
the aggressive Muslim. Thus, the discourse draws a sharp boundary between the tolerant
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insider and the intolerant, aggressive outsider. It also draws on a powerful metaphor of
gender to emphasise this boundary: that is, it distinguishes between the image of the
aggressive, hyper masculine Muslim who has subjugated the weak and tolerant Hindu in
the past (Mathur, 2008:69-73).
Ascribing characteristics to both communities entails a process of homogenisation of
ethnic identity, which lays down strict definitions of the identities ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ as
well as the differences between the two communities. Differences between the two
communities are constructed through systematic forgetting and selective repetition (Das,
1995: 129). Points of difference between the two communities are highlighted repeatedly,
while the shared bonds of cultural similarity such as language, food habits, and everyday
interactions are systematically suppressed and silenced. The internal differences within the
two religious communities are also ignored, thus painting a picture of ‘Hindu’ and
‘Muslim’ as homogenous identities with fixed characteristics. The characteristics ascribed
to both communities are so strong that they resemble caricatures. These stereotypes are
deployed in constructing a linear and one sided view of history in which the ‘tolerant,
peace loving Hindu’ has been historically victimised by the ‘aggressive Muslim’.
The idea of the Hindus as a victimised community does not stop at the ancient past, but
continues into more recent history and also pervades the present. Linking the idea of
Muslim intolerance and aggression to the idea of Islamic separatism, the discourse places
responsibility for the partition in 1947 on the Muslim community (Mathur, 2008: 74). The
concrete physical presence of ‘the enemy nation’ .i.e. the Islamic state of Pakistan across
the border, with whom India is not on good terms makes it easy to evoke memories of the
Partition and float the idea of an internal enemy. The Muslims who stayed behind in India
are portrayed as ‘traitors’ of the nation and agents or spies of Pakistan who continue to
pose a threat to the nation (Gupta, 2007:32). In this manner, the notion of Hindus as a
threatened and victimised community continues into the present. This sense of continuity in
history is integral to the discourse. By establishing a sense of linear continuity between the
past and present, it makes the case that the Hindus have always, since eternity, suffered at
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the hands of the Muslims. It also gives the message that unless immediate action is taken,
Hindus will continue to be victims in the future. At this point, discourse transcends the
abstract domain of thoughts and words and has concrete consequences:
“Collective stories have political consequences when, as myths they purport to be
history, as history they are reinterpreted as theories, and as theories they make up
stories about events. Theories that become stories create fictive truths. Since in
politics, truth-telling and story-telling are part of the same process, it becomes
possible to interrogate the past in order to transform the future….such stories are
collectivized, systematized, and formed into what have been called master
narratives”(Apter, 2004: 11645-11646).
The concrete political consequences of the stories that constitute the master narrative of the
Hindutva discourse include targeted violence against Muslims, such as in Gujarat. The
‘fictive truth’ of Hindus as victims is extremely significant in determining how the
discourse contextualizes the violence that it encourages. The strong sense of victimization
frames all violence by Hindus as a retaliation, a response to current or past injustices
(Brass, 2003:12). All the violence is carried out in the name of the community, in this case,
the Hindu community. In this way, every act of violence against “the other” community is
transformed from a morally wrong act to an act of self-defence or a fight against injustice
(Das, 1995: 130-132). Thus, even though the militant Hindutva discourse is rife with
militant and aggressive terminology and narratives which directly and indirectly instigate
violence against Muslims, it projects the agency of its aggression away from itself and on
the victim, thereby indulging in what Brass calls “blame displacement.”(Brass, 2003: 15-
16). This is one of the central paradoxes of this discourse. I will return to the link between
the cultural content of the discourse and blame displacement later.
Constructing ‘the other’
Another, related paradox of this discourse is that though it claims to be a discourse about
Hindu community identity, it is overwhelmingly concerned with ‘the other.’ Drawing on
Barth’s idea of ethnic identity, Mathur has pointed out that the Hindutva discourse is more
concerned with the boundary between the Hindu and the ‘other’ rather than the content that
35
the boundary encloses (.i.e. on defining what it means to be Hindu in positive terms)
(Mathur, 2008: 120). In other words, the unifying factor in the ideology of the Hindu Right
is less the exact nature of Hindu identity, and more an attitude that appears as a hatred of
religious minorities (Mathur, 2008:53). Amongst the religious minorities in India, the
Muslims are the most convenient target of hatred because of the particular socio-historic
context of the Indian subcontinent. The memories of partition and the existence of Pakistan
makes Muslims the perfect enemies for the ‘Hindu nation’ of India (Gupta, 2005: 37).
Thus, the discourse of Hindu nationalism is dependent on, and constructed primarily on the
idea of the existence of this perfect enemy.
Leadership and Agency
I have used phrases such as ‘constructed’ and ‘most convenient target’ while referring to
the Hindutva discourse in the above paragraph to underline the point that this hatred for
Muslims is not inherent, but created. The construction of a discourse entails agency:
“…. stories are collectivized, systematized, and formed into what have been called
master narratives. For this purpose agency is required, a public figure able to play
the special role of ‘storyteller’ whether in the form of philosopher-kings,
cosmocratic figures, politicians, soothsayers, diviners, or others.”(Benjamin 1969
in Apter, 2004: 11646)
Further, the creation of a master narrative or ideology does not by itself create violence. As
Denich argues, the transformation of idea into action involves communication between
leaders and their audiences (the public) that invokes people to act in accordance with this
collective ideology. In other words, the creation of a discourse that encourages violent
action involves the conscious construction and manipulation of symbols by leaders
(Denich, 1994:369; Geertz in Denich, 1994: 369). In the case of Gujarat, the leaders were a
varied but organised group ranging from representatives of the state to members of Hindu
Right organisations, who clearly had an important role to play in the violence. Judging
from the flamboyant and rhetorical use of inflammatory signals by these leaders, one can
infer that the use and manipulation of these symbols was intentional. In other words, the
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repeated use of such signals demonstrates the intentionality and agency behind the anti
Muslim discourse in Gujarat.
Thus, I am arguing that the use of signals (which includes narratives, words, actions as
well as tangible symbols) as mobilising tools is a conscious act by leaders. These signals
are thus integral to the discourse: they constitute a part of, and are crucial for several
aspects of this discourse.
The functionality of cultural signs and narratives
Cultural signs and narratives are integral to several aspects of the functioning and
acceptance of discourses on community identity. Symbols help in creating community
identity by linking micro, everyday life to a larger and crystallized macro identity. For
instance, the Hindutva discourse gives symbols that are a part of everyday life (such as
mosques, beards, colour, flags, traditional garments) a new meaning by injecting them with
nationalist or anti-nationalist zeal, which has helped in creating a sense of identity among
the Hindus in India (Mathur, 2008: 84; Panikar, 1993: 26). In this manner, the innovative
use of symbols has incorporated many people into the fold of the Hindutva agenda
(Panikar, 1993: 26). Symbols thus serve as an important mobilising tool for political
discourses by creating a sense of identity around which several people rally.
As argued above, the concept of identity that emerges is often narrow and extremely
homogenised. The use of tangible symbols freezes collective identity which is fluid by
nature to strict definitions. These strict definitions in turn become the basis for the
ascription of differences and the boundary between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’. The negative
image of the other i.e. the enemy, when taken to the extreme, can result in the
dehumanization of the other, whereby this ‘other’ is defined as less than human.
A fear of the marginalized
The ‘less than human’ status of ‘the other’ implies that ‘the enemy other’ is always
constructed as inferior to the self. At the same time, the enemy is an object of fear, and
poses a threat to the self. For example, the Hindu militant discourse in Gujarat evokes a
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great deal of fear of the victim .i.e. the Muslims. This fear of the marginalized is a
hallmark of such discourse. Another interesting example of this is witch hunting. Several
anthropological accounts mention that the victim is often feared in cases of witch hunting
(Mathur, 2008:164). How can one explain this fear of the victim? One possible explanation
is that the dominating group can fear the retaliation by the victims or the marginalized that
they suppress. Thus those who are marginalized are viewed as dangerous for the
established system of power (Lidenbaum in Mathur, 2008: 165). To counter this threat, one
needs to indulge in aggression to keep the victims at bay. Fear and aggression may thus
constitute two sides of the same coin.
The extreme manifestation of such aggression is seen in cases of violence such as those in
Gujarat. Such cases of inter ethnic violence are often symbolic in that they do not target
just the body of their victims, but the cultural values that the victim is seen to represent.
Further, they seek to establish superiority of one’s own cultural values over ‘the other.’ In
other words:
…Violence is never just violence, it expresses cultural ideas of who is the enemy
and how that presence is to be dealt with. Not only are the targets of chosen
carefully, but the forms of violence follow a cultural logic (Sarkar in Mathur,
2008:185).
The fear and dehumanization of Muslims in India is expressed in a symbolic language.
From narratives of history to the systematic destruction of cultural institutions such as
mosques, the discourse surrounding the violence in Gujarat reflects fear, aggression and
prejudice towards Muslims, and can thus be called Islamophobic.
The normalization of prejudice
The discourse draws on images that are part of everyday life. Further, it manages to
penetrate the popular consciousness through public media such as school textbooks,
electronic and print media and other means. The everyday nature of such discourse
indicates that it normalizes violent nationalism and makes it acceptable as common sense
(Kabir, 2002: 10). Violence and prejudice can be normalized by the manner in which it is
expressed, articulated and interpreted repeatedly in daily life.
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In other words, I am arguing that the discourse and its language of symbols, signs and
narratives provides clues to the link between violence in daily life and large scale instances
of ethnic violence. This link is the dehumanization of the subjects of the violence, which is
expressed in the language of public discourse. However, this link is neither linear nor
obvious. As Ray has argued, violence in daily life is linked to large scale outbreaks of
violence, but in complex ways (Ray, 2007:87). Though it is clear that cultural signs and
narratives constitute an important part of such discourse, how effective they are is hard to
measure. The question then remains: to what extent does prejudice, arising out of an
Islamophobic discourse (of symbols and signs that constitute the language of the conflict),
have a bearing on the actual killings? Is it possible to identify the stages of the violence in
which cultural signs and narratives have the most impact? The next section addresses these
questions.
4.2. Discourse and Violence: the link
In order to analyse the exact role of symbols in the violence, one needs to understand the
nature and various aspects of the violence itself. The starting point of this dissertation was
that cases of targeted mass violence such as the incidents described in Gujarat are pre
planned to some degree. Brass has further argued that there are three stages in which riots
are produced: planning, enactment and interpretation (Brass, 2003). Using this framework,
I would argue that cultural signs and narratives play differential roles in these different
stages. As argued above, the extensive use of such signals by the leaders in Gujarat implies
a degree of planning. I will now analyse the role of this cultural discourse in the enactment
as well as the contextualisation of the violence.
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Enactment
This is the stage in which the actual killings occur. The question that arises here is: to what
extent can prejudice, which is created through an Islamophobic discourse replete with
signs and narratives, be a causal factor in the actual killings? I would argue that one has to
be careful about the weightage one gives to the prejudice created through the signs and
narratives of the Hindutva and similar discourses in enabling violence. I will discuss this
further in the following paragraphs.
I have argued so far that the public discourse in several parts of India, for instance Gujarat,
is heavily communalised and Islamophobic because of a strong presence of the Hindutva
narratives, signs and symbols. That any dehumanizing discourse is dangerous for a
democratic society is an obvious statement. As Appadurai has argued, the influence of
politicized discourse can influence people to reconceptualise their neighbours and
acquaintances as part of a threatening enemy community. (Appadurai in Frøystad,
2009:451). In this way, prejudice can be a contributing factor to the violence.
However, I would argue that one should not exaggerate the role of prejudice in causing
mass violence. Mass violence is complex and multi causal: thus, no one factor can explain
the occurrence of mass violence (Tambiah, 2005: 920; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois,
2004). The exact extent to which the signs and symbols of the Hindu Right discourse
manage to create prejudice in society, and the exact role of that prejudice in the violence, is
hard to measure and beyond the scope of this paper. However, keeping the multi causal
nature of the violence in mind, one can argue that prejudice could be one of, while not the
sole cause of violence.
There is also another, related reason why signs and narratives cannot be assigned a
determining role in causing mass violence. I have argued in Chapter 2 that instances of
mass violence rarely start spontaneously, and should be seen as orchestrated political
productions that use the argument of spontaneity as a cover up for the political crafting
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behind such violence (Tambiah, 1990:755; Brass, 2003:30). Taking this into account, I
would argue that assigning prejudice (arising from a discourse rich in signs and narratives)
a central role in causing violence would assist in portraying pre planned violence as
spontaneous. There is a tendency in India to view Hindu Muslim riots as spontaneous
outpourings of anger which arise due to the pre existing prejudices and hostilities between
the two communities. As Brass has pointed out, this explanation is incomplete because it
does not take into account the pre planned nature and the intentionality behind the violence
(Brass, 2003: 10-11). The existence of prejudice between communities is not sufficient to
cause people to engage in acts of violence against the other. The conversion of prejudice to
targeted and organised violent action against ‘the other’ requires other factors, such as
leadership. Thus, an explanation of inter ethnic violence as a spontaneous outburst of anger
arising due to pre existing hostilities between communities diverts attention away from the
intentionality and agents of the violence, a point which I will discuss further in the next
section.
On the basis of the above analysis, I conclude that in a causal analysis of violence,
prejudice constitutes a necessary, but not a sufficient cause for the outbreak of inter ethnic
violence.
Interpretation/Contextualisation
The manner in which violence is interpreted and explained is important, among other
things, in determining agency i.e. assigning responsibility for the violence. In my view,
identifying responsibility is a first step towards ensuring justice for the victims in a
situation of violence. Thus, the interpretation of a case of inter ethnic violence has direct
consequences for the manner in which human rights violations are understood and
addressed. I will return to discussing the difference between the state’s understanding and a
human rights perspective of inter ethnic violence in the concluding chapter (Chapter 5).
Tambiah has pointed out that the ‘staging’ of the violence often uses antecedent
happenings as “precedents for later orchestrations” (Tambiah, 1990:755). In the case of
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Gujarat, the targeted killings of Muslims were justified by the Hindu Right as a
spontaneous reaction to the train burning in Godhra (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 4).
Further, the Hindutva discourse surrounding the violence is replete with references to
inherent and essential differences between the two communities, which are also meant to
imply that the violence was a spontaneous outburst in which these underlying tensions and
differences between the two communities came to the fore. This explanation diverts
attention away from the agents of the violence .i.e. the Hindu Right forces in India. Thus,
the discourse and its language of signs and symbols served a functional purpose for the
agents of the violence and assisted in the process of displacing responsibility.
The question then is: on whose shoulders does the burden of the violence lie? Often, the
blame shifts away from the perpetrators to the victims. The Hindutva Right discourse’s
almost obsessive focus on demonizing the other .i.e. the Muslim through its language of
signs and narratives is a case in point. The Islamophobia conjured up by this discourse i.e.
the negative and fearful characteristics it ascribes to the Muslim, puts the onus of the
violence on to ‘the Muslim’. Thus, in the contextualisation of the violence, cultural signs
and narratives serve as important tools for diffusing blame away from the perpetrators and
on to the victims.
Shubh Mathur has argued that in the Indian context, the tendency to diffuse or displace
blame is not limited to the Hindu Right discourse alone. According to her, a large part of
the secular public as well as academic discourse in India gives primacy to the role of
prejudices and existing hostilities between Hindus and Muslims as explanations for the
outbreaks of violence. In other words, current academic discourses seek to balance the
guilt by putting equal blame on both sides, on perpetrators and victims (Mathur, 2008:13-
16). She argues that this kind of academia is counter productive because it separates the
action from its agents, and thus “creates the gap which allows the violence to happen in the
first place” (Mathur, 2008: 173). Varshney’s explanation for communal violence, which
gives primacy to the absence of civic engagement as a determining factor and thus
separates the violence from its agents, is an example of such arguments (Varshney, 2001).
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In this way, some of the academic discourse in India unintentionally ends up assisting in
blame displacement and reinforces the process of dehumanizing the victim started by the
Islamophobic discourse of Hindutva in India. The acknowledgement of human tragedy is
thus lost in the jumble of biased signs and narratives, and sometimes, the obscure language
of academia. This kind of contextualisation is counter productive from a human rights
perspective.
***
To sum up, there is a grand discourse on violence in India that views cases of communal
violence as spontaneous, random occurrences that have roots in deep seated hatred felt by
two communities for each other. All too often, Brass argues, pre planned violence and anti
Muslim pogroms in India are termed riots by the press, the state and the general public
(Brass, 2003: 10). The citing of incidents such as Godhra (in Gujarat 2002) as the main
causes/focal points around which riots start spontaneously can be understood as a part of
this larger contextualisation of such violence as spontaneous.
Scholars like Brass (Brass, 2003) and Mathur (Mathur, 2008) argue against this
perspective and say that one must locate the agents or instruments behind the violence. In
my view, it is extremely important to make an analytical distinction between spontaneous
and pre planned acts of violence, even though it may be difficult to prove in specific cases.
Communal violence inevitably has a cyclical nature, and the perpetrators in one instance
may be victims in another. That is to say, there are different actors and leaders involved in
different situations of violence: in the case of Gujarat, evidence points to the Hindu Right
leaders, while other cases of violence might involve other groups of people. The point
remains: if one is to redress human rights violations effectively, one has to bring the
perpetrators of violence to book. For this, an instrumentalist view of violence is more
productive than a primordial view. Such academic perspectives would also take into
account the suffering of the victims, and give them a voice. This would help in the more





The aim of this dissertation has been to try and understand inter ethnic conflict from a
perspective of public discourse. Based on the analysis in the previous chapters, the study
draws certain conclusions on the role of public discourse in the development of community
identity, and the use of a language of signs, symbols and narratives in inter ethnic violence.
The Role of Discourse
My analysis of the Hindutva discourse shows that this discourse constructs a Hindu
community identity primarily on a negative basis .i.e. in opposition to an enemy ‘other’
.i.e. the ‘Muslim’. This ‘other’ poses a threat to the self, and needs to be controlled by
violence. Thus, violence against an enemy ‘other’ forms a basis for such discourse.
Further, such violence is framed as vengeance and retaliation, which displaces blame away
from the perpetrators of the violence. Often, this blame is transferred to the targets of such
violence. For these reasons, I would argue that it is justified to label the Hindutva discourse
Islamophobic.
The analysis of the discourse shows that its language of signs, symbols and narratives
plays a role in dehumanizing the targets of such violence and creating prejudice against
them in society. However, such prejudice plays more of a role in the process of interpreting
and contextualisation of the violence than in its enactment. This study argues that mass
violence is generally planned or implemented for political reasons, in order to secure
positions of power. Prejudice or negative stereotypes about ‘the other’ play an important
role in displacing responsibility for the violence from the perpetrators (in the case, the
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leaders of the Hindu Right) to the victims (here, ‘the Muslim’). In other words, the
discourse not only encourages violence, it also justifies it.
From a human rights perspective, this dehumanization of the targets of human rights
violations has several implications at multiple levels.
Community Identity
The process of dehumanization works at the level of community consciousness by shaping
common, widely shared attitudes about community identity. In other words, it influences
the informal sphere of everyday interaction and culture, where community identity is
defined. It is here that we can see that the abstract image that discourses construct of ‘the
enemy other’ have implications for individuals lives in reality. For instance, the image of
the ‘hyper masculine, cruel, aggressive Muslim’ may influence people to equate individual
members of the Muslim community with this image (Appadurai in Frøystad, 2009:451).
Thus, the pervasive signs, symbols and narratives that construct a less-than-human other
feed directly into violent acts that have consequences for the human rights of individual
human beings. In this way, dehumanization plays a role, albeit limited, in enabling human
rights violations. Further, as argued above, dehumanization of victims justifies mass
violence as retaliation, and puts responsibility for the violence on their shoulders. This
raises the question of determining agency in cases of human rights violations, which is
extremely important in order to ensure justice for the victims. This brings us to another
aspect of society that is influenced by and is part of the process of dehumanization .i.e. the
state system.
The role of the State and the problem of state compliance
The relationship between the state and the victims of communal violence in India is a
complex one, a detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I
would like to raise a few points about how the state contributes to the process of
legitimising violence.
45
The state represents the formal structure on which the system of human rights – their
execution and protection – is based (Smith, 2007: 164-165). In spite of the fact that the
Indian state is a signatory to several international human rights treaties23, the state of
Gujarat and India failed to protect the human rights of its citizens from being violated.
These violations include, amongst others, violations of the most fundamental human right
.i.e. the Right to Life (Smith, 2007:194), and of The Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Citizen’s Initiative, 2002). This
glaring gap between the theory and practice of human rights deserves academic attention,
for, as Norberto Bobbio has pointed out, the point of rights is “… not so much how to
justify them, but how to protect them …” (Bobbio, 1996:10).
According to the international human rights system, in case human rights are violated, it is
the prerogative of the state to redress the human rights violations by acknowledging the
victims’ loss and punishing the perpetrators of such violence. In the case of Gujarat, this
means that victims have to ask for justice from the very state that is involved in violating
their rights. Since agents of the state are often directly involved in communal violence in
India, most often no steps are taken to prosecute them. The fact that the Chief Minister and
several other leaders of the state of Gujarat were clearly involved in inciting the violence
has not had any implications for their political career. This failure on the part of the state to
punish the perpetrators and acknowledge the loss of the victims of the violence suppresses
the voice of the victims, and contributes to their dehumanization.
Academic Discourse
This study has also addressed the role of academic discourse in the process of
dehumanization. One of the arguments of this dissertation, drawn from Mathur, has been
that some of the mainstream secular and public academia in India unintentionally ends up
aiding the process of blame displacement by giving primacy to prejudice, and thus doesn’t
23
India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1979. Article 6(1) of the
ICCPR guarantees that the right to life of all citizens shall be protected by law.
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allocate responsibility. The main problem with such paradigms is that they fail to take into
account the perspective and the voice of the victim (Mathur, 2008:186-187).
On the basis of the above arguments, I conclude that there is a need for a more practical
understanding of situations of inter ethnic violence, which I will return to in the last
chapter.
5.2. Parallel Perspectives
The focus of this study has been on the construction of community identity through
discourse within a specific community. This case study of the dynamics of communication
about ‘the other’ within the Hindu community in Gujarat has clear parallels with other
cases in India and elsewhere.
A significant aspect of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India is the fact that the
Muslims are a minority, which creates an inherent asymmetry between the two
communities. Gupta has argued that the scope and nature of minority (Muslim) and
majority (Hindu) inspired politics varies greatly in India, and that except for Kashmir,
minority politics in India is of little consequence. He goes on to argue that:
“On the other hand, religion and politics combine frequently, and with telling
impact, nationwide when it comes to expressing Hindu majoritarianism…” (Gupta,
2007: 32).
While Islamic fundamentalism certainly exists in India, it doesn’t penetrate public
discourse and consciousness to the degree that Hindu fundamentalism does. The
Islamophobic discourse surrounding the violence in Gujarat testifies this. Its rationalisation
as ‘common sense’ by large sections of the Hindu community and the consequent
acceptance of the violence indicates that violence from the top (the state) was accompanied
by agency and consent from below (Kabir, 2002: 10; Mathur, 2008: 171). I would
therefore argue that in the current context, Islamophobia is a serious problem that requires
urgent attention in India today.
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The phenomenon of Islamophobia and the divisive language of the Hindutva discourse has
parallels in discourse on identity across the world. Thus, the analysis on the link between
the stereotyping of community identity and inter ethnic violence is replicated in other
identity discourses. The case of Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland has been
mentioned earlier. Denich has pointed out that the violent dismemberment of Yugoslavia
in 1992 was accompanied by a discourse that manipulated symbols and revived history in
order to construct and reinforce strict boundaries between the nationalist identities of Serbs
and Croatians. The construction of this discourse also required leadership. Denich argues
that in 1991, both Serbian and Croatian leaders could have avoided creating oppositions
between the two groups by using inclusive and egalitarian strategies for nationhood and the
recognition of citizenship. Instead, the leaders of both camps chose to propagate exclusive
ideas of nationalism, in which ethnicity was defined as the criteria for citizenship (Denich,
1994: 367-369). This conscious emphasis on differences and hostility between the two
communities by leaders is similar to the extremes of Hindu-Muslim identity discourse.
Another similarity is the focus on the past in order to justify violence in the present against
‘the other.’ The memory of the World War II massacre of Serbs by the Croatian state was
revived and emphasised repeatedly by Serbian leaders to justify a separatist national
identity and violence against the Croats in 1991. A strong sense of having been victimised
in the past pervaded this revivalist Serbian discourse (Denich, 1994: 367,377). This notion
of victimisation by referring to history finds a parallel in the Islamophobic discourse of the
Hindu Right.
Further, Islamophobia is not limited to India alone, but exists across the world. Though the
Indian situation has a specific Hindu-Muslim dimension that doesn’t extend to other parts
of the world, Islamophobia in India is nevertheless related to this larger phenomenon. As
the report of the International Initiative for Justice points out in its conclusion:
“It would be a mistake to attempt to locate … the Gujarat pogrom, at a purely local
or even national level, because the local anti-Muslim discourse both feeds into and
draws strength from the global anti-Muslim discourse. What follows then is an easy
subliminal association of Muslim-Terrorist-Aggressor … The idea of exacting
collective punishment against an entire community for the actions of unrelated
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individuals, or of attacking a much weaker and numerically smaller group in the
name of “self-defence” has acquired new validity in the post-September 11
scenario.” (IIJ Report, 2003: Para 10.3)
The post 9/11 crackdown on Muslims in the USA is a classic example of subjugating
individual human rights to the interests of the state. This is especially significant because
the protection and implementation of human rights is dependent on individual nation
states. In this regard, the subjugation of human rights in the name of state security indicates
a serious flaw in this system. The Western images of radical Islam justify human rights
violations against Muslims. That is to say, one of the similarities between Islamophobia in
India and in the West is that state infringement of basic rights receives tacit popular
consent. On this basis, I would argue that human rights violations targeting specific
communities today result from sanction given by from both leaders (above) and from local
actors (below). Thus, any checks on such human rights violations must necessarily involve
both the state and the local community. What kind of checks and practical steps can be
taken to ensure the more effective implementation of human rights? The next chapter will





The vision of the human rights discourse articulated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is based on a universalistic stance towards human rights in that it believes in
the idea of certain basic, inalienable rights for all humans that are applicable across barriers
of culture. This dissertation has argued that dehumanizing discourses on identity (such as
Hindutva) pose a major challenge to the implementation of this ideal. Three levels of
society influenced by this dehumanizing process have been identified: the state, the level of
community consciousness and academic discourse. In this chapter, I will suggest that in
order to implement human rights more effectively in the Indian context, varied strategies
should be adopted to address the problem at different levels.
At the level of the state system, the human rights discourse can be used effectively. A
major weakness of human rights is that they are dependent or implementation on the state,
which can abuse its power and violate the rights of the human beings that it is supposed to
protect (Turner in Short, 2008:7). This kind of state complicity in communal violence was
seen in Gujarat, followed by the subsequent apathy of the Indian government. However,
the Indian state does not oppose human rights in principle since it wants to maintain a good
face in international relations. As Messer argues, no state today would go on record
opposing human rights (Messer, 1993: 223). Thus, human rights can be used by civil
society and the international community to pressurise the Indian state to prosecute the
agents behind human rights violations. This method of working is central to human rights
activism, which is primarily concerned with mobilising support to pressurise abusers to
stop human rights violations (Ignatieff, 2001: 9). In India, the work and research done by
national and international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch and other civil society bodies using the language of human rights has
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been instrumental in pointing out state complicity in the violence and pushing the Indian
government to ensure justice and provide relief to the victims of the violence in Gujarat. In
this way, the language of human rights can be used effectively to redress human rights
violations at the level of the state system.
At the level of popular consciousness, one of the problems is that the language of human
rights is culturally alien to the average person in India. In my view, this is a major
handicap of the human rights discourse and is one of the reasons why its outreach and
influence remains limited in the arena of culture. One of the arguments of this dissertation
has been that the Hindutva discourse has managed to establish a prominent presence at the
level of popular consciousness. It has managed to gain a strong foothold in popular culture
and has become part and parcel of what is familiar, and that people identify with. To
counter this, the implementation of human rights should also be done by using languages
and methods of communication that people identify with. In other words, while the
framework for change should be that of human rights, the strategies for implementation
should be adapted to the specific context and take the local needs and situation into
account (Wilson and Mitchell, 2003:13).
For an alternative discourse of secularism and tolerance to acquire the level of legitimacy
and acceptability that a xenophobic discourse has acquired, it should draw lessons from the
same. Since a presence in the public sphere and popular culture is the key to the success of
Hindutva, the secular movement should try and “build a social consciousness through the
terrain of culture” (Panikar, 1993: 31). The efforts of some NGOs in India are geared
towards this end. For instance, some organisations have chosen to counter the power of
symbols appropriated by the Hindu Right by promoting symbols of peace. A successful
example is from Godhra (where the train burning took place in 2002), where a group of
twenty NGOs organised a rally to distribute roses on the same day when the Hindu Right
forces were distributing trishuls (weapons/traditional Indian tridents). An excerpt from a
newspaper report read:
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“Some said it with roses, others with trishuls. The medium definitely was the
message on Sunday as Godhra lived another day of contrasts...Carrying placards
which conveyed messages of peace, harmony and goodwill, the rallyists marched
through the streets, drawing people out of their homes and shops…around 3,000
people took part in the rally…in the latter part of the day, the VHP24 programme
turned out to be a damp squib, with only about 250 of the expected 1000 initiates
arriving for the trishul distribution.”(Express India, 29 March 2004, emphases
added).
Such initiatives are appropriate since they counter xenophobic discourse by using the
media of communication it uses, and try to penetrate the crucial arena of the public sphere.
Further, as the participation of three thousand people in the above event indicates, such
measures can successfully involve members of a community to work together. Action
initiatives based on community participation are thus efficient means to build a secular
consciousness, and lessen the threat of communal violence and human rights violations
(Shankar and Gerstein, 2007: 8). Initiatives that employ community participation and use a
language that the local populace can identify with may be more successful in checking the
growth of communalism in the informal sphere of everyday life. Such approaches are most
useful when they implement the universal principles of human rights with strategies that
are specific to the demands of different cultural contexts (Freeman, 2002: 104).
6.2. Academic Recommendations
A third aspect of society influenced by the process of dehumanization is academic
discourse. This dissertation has questioned the role of some of the academic discourse on
mass violence that unintentionally aids a process of blame displacement by understanding
cases of violence as spontaneous ‘riots’. To separate the action from its agents is counter
productive for the redressing of human rights violations (Mathur, 2008).
From a human rights perspective, it would be more beneficial to establish academic
paradigms that are more action oriented in that they locate agency behind the violence.
24 Refer to Page 10.
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This argument is part of a general debate on the politics of social research .i.e. on whether
academics should play an engaged or objective role in the field. In the Current
Anthropology debate on objectivity vs. militancy, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995)
advocates an engaged stance in her proposal of a ‘militant anthropology’, which goes
beyond a mere record of human thinking and engages actively with issues of ethics and
power. Her main argument is that when encountering cases of human rights violations and
injustice, the researcher should shed his/her role as a passive bystander and take stands to
try and redress them (Scheper-Hughes, 1995). Roy D’ Andrade disagrees with her and
critiques what he calls ‘the moral models in anthropology’ by arguing that they are too
black-and white and mono causal. He points out that human misery is a complex social
phenomenon, and it is not always possible to pinpoint blame and identify
aggressors/oppressors (D’Andrade, 1995). Instead, he advocates an objective approach
which would, according to him, avoid the pitfalls of mono causality, and may be able to
present more varied perspectives on a given issue.
I share D’ Andrade’s concerns that research should avoid falling into the trap of mono
causality and needs to take the complexity of a situation into account. However, I would
argue that human rights research, in a certain way, is biased by definition since it
prioritizes certain values such as the universal ideal of certain basic, inalienable rights for
all humans. Thus, human rights research should reflect the concerns expressed in Nancy-
Scheper Hughes’s idea of “militant anthropology”, which is more action-oriented, and
promises more in terms of preventing and redressing human rights violations. Extending
this idea and adapting it to other academic disciplines as well could be useful in
constructing academic paradigms that help in addressing human rights violations. There is
scope for the development of action oriented perspectives in various social science
disciplines. At the very least, social science research should not be counter productive by
contributing to the dehumanization of victims of such violations.
There is also scope for research on the link between Islamophobia in India and
Islamophobia in the West. As this dissertation suggests, the two discourses feed into and
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give strength to each other. The link between discourses at the local and the national level,
between the national and the international level merits further research. This might help
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The following article featured in the online version of newspaper The Independent on 2nd
May 2009. It reports the recent decision of the Supreme Court of India to set up fast-track
tribunals to deal with the pending court cases from the violence in Gujarat in 2002.
Available online at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/tribunals-set-up-
to-examine-slaughter-of-indian-muslims-1677666.html
Tribunals set up to examine slaughter of Indian Muslims
Politician tipped to be next PM investigated for his role in 2002 sectarian riots
By Andrew Buncombe in Delhi
Saturday, 2 May 2009
SEBASTIAN D'SOUZA/ AFP/GETTY IMAGES
A Hindu mob brandishes swords at Muslims
during street battles in Bapunagar, Ahmedabad
in March 2002, when inter-faith violence left
2,000 dead
Seven years after hundreds of Muslims in
Gujarat were murdered in some of India's most
vicious religious violence since partition, the
families of those who died are a step closer to
justice after the
Supreme Court ordered the setting up of fast-track tribunals. Among the people to be investigated will be the
state's controversial chief minister, Narendra Modi, a man tipped as a future prime minister of India.
The court order, which came in the middle of India's general election, instructs legal authorities in Gujarat to
establish tribunals to examine 14 outstanding cases relating to the 2002 killings. "You can be assured of a
quick and fair trial now and that was very urgently needed. It is great news for the riot victims who had been
waiting for justice," said Mukul Sinha, a lawyer representing some of the victims. The so-called "Gujarat
riots" that swept through parts of the western state in the spring of 2002 left as many as 2,000 people dead,
the overwhelming majority of them Muslims. The trigger for the violence was a fire on a train carrying
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Hindu pilgrims that killed around 60 people, which was alleged to have been started by a Muslim mob.
Inquiries have suggested that the blaze on the Sabarmati Express was an accident. Either way, what followed
was a sustained slaughter of Muslims.
Houses were set on fire, people were burned alive, others fled for their lives. While some officials claimed
that the violence was a spontaneous reaction to the train fire, there is persuasive evidence – such as the easy
access of the mob to land registry records – to suggest the violence was at least partly planned. There have
been persistent accusations that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was in charge of the state, and chief
minister Mr Modi played a crucial role in the violence.
In Gujarat, the wounds of 2002 have never healed. While the BJP was subsequently twice re-elected to state
office – largely on the back of a booming economy and of Mr Modi's profile as a man who would "protect"
Hindus – thousands of Muslims remain in refugee camps on the fringes of Ahmedabad, unable (in some
cases too afraid) to return to their villages. For many in India, the failure to properly address what happened
remains a painful sore.
The Supreme Court has also ordered an inquiry into allegations that Mr Modi failed to stop – and may even
have encouraged – the 2002 violence. Earlier, one of his ministers in the Gujarat state assembly, Maya
Kodnani, gave herself up to the authorities after a special investigating team accused of her leading mobs.
Both she and Mr Modi deny the allegations against them.
Among the individual cases that will be looked at by the newly ordered tribunals will be the burning of the
Sabarmati Express, the killing of up to 95 people in the Naroda Patia neighbourhood of Ahmedabad and the
murder of Ehsan Jafri, a senior Muslim politician from the Congress Party. A 2007 investigation by the
Tehelka news magazine discovered that Mr Ehsan was murdered despite frantically calling Mr Modi's office
for help.
"Five or six people held him, then someone struck him with a sword, chopped off his hand, then his legs,
then everything else," the magazine quoted one of those accused as saying. "After cutting him to pieces they
put him on the wood they'd piled and set it on fire ... burnt him alive."
Narendra Modi: Rise of the 'modern-day Nero'
Few Indian politicians can match Narendra Modi for confidence and swagger. None comes close for stirring
controversy.
If, as expected, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) fail to secure power in this election, many expect that Mr
Modi will seamlessly take control and push aside the party leader, LK Advani.
It would be a remarkable achievement for a man was once described by the Indian Supreme Court as a
"modern-day Nero", and was refused a US visa on the grounds he had "violated religious freedom".
But Mr Modi, 59, has worked hard to project himself as a tough leader, ready for the national stage. He has
promoted Gujarat as one of India's leading business locations and was able to lure industrial Ratan Tata to
build his much vaunted Nano "people's car" in the state.
During the election campaign, Mr Modi has been a star performer, mocking the Congress party as an "old
woman". Such is his popularity that plastic masks of the well-dressed politician are among the election's
bestsellers. But Mr Modi, whose estranged, never-talked-about wife lives alone in a Gujarat village, is yet to
deal with the religious riots of 2002. He has always denied involvement but accusations continue to dog him.
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Appendix B
Map of India showing Gujarat
The white portion on the map shows the state of Gujarat.
The state of Gujarat has an area of 196,024 sq. km. and a population of 50.67 million.
There are 25 districts, 170 blocks and 18539 villages.
Source: Government of Gujarat








Residence Person Male Female
All Religions Total 50671017 26385577 24285440
Hindus Total 45143074 23538770 21604304
Muslims Total 4592854 2370832 2222022
Christians Total 284092 142881 141211
Sikhs Total 45587 24987 20600
Buddhists Total 17829 9439 8390
Jains Total 525305 266768 258537
Others Total 28698 14452 14246
Religion not
stated
Total 33578 17448 16130
Source: Census of India 2001.
Year: Period of fiscal year in India is April to March, e.g. year shown as 1990-91
relates to April 1990 to March 1991.
